St. John's Law Review
Volume 38
Number 2 Volume 38, May 1964, Number 2

Article 46

Substituted Service--Section 735 of the RPAPL and Section 308(3)
of the CPLR
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1964 ]

NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

The Municipal Court Code, which the Civil Court Act replaced
inter alia, provided that the summons should inform the defendant
of the cause of action against him by being served with a
complaint or an indorsement upon the summons.2 52 This practice
was retained in the Civil Court Act.253 Since the summons under
the Civil Court Act requires the defendant to appear and answer
the complaint,254 it is obvious that the defendant cannot satisfy
this requirement unless the complaint is served with the summons. 255 Service of a summons without any complaint at all
will render it jurisdictionally defective, and hence, void.256 Even
if the defendant had not made his motion to dismiss but had ignored
the plaintiff could not enter a default
the summons and defaulted
257
judgment against him.
Note that the plaintiff's procedure would have been quite
valid in the supreme court, where Section 3012 of the CPLR
dispenses with the requirement that the complaint accompany the
summons. The Bar should recognize that in the civil, 25 s district 250
and (as of April 1, 1965) city 260 courts, the summons cannot
be served alone (except in service by publication).
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735 of the RPAPL and

Section 308(3) of the CPLR
In Wayside Homes, Inc. v. Upton,261 a landlord brought a
summary proceeding to recover possession of real property occupied
by a defaulting tenant, and for the rent due and owing. Substituted service of process was made pursuant to Section 735
"Service of the notice of
of the RPAPL, which provides:
petition and petition shall be made in the same manner as personal
service of a summons in an action; except that if service cannot
be made in such manner, it shall be made by [substituted service]
2 52

MUNIC. CT. CODE § 19.

§902(a)-(b). The one exception to this rule is when service
is made by publication. See 29A McKINNEy's CCA § 902, commentary
141.
254 CCA § 402(a)-(b) ; N.Y.C. Crv. Cr. R. 2(a)-(b). Defendant will also,
of course, have the alternative of moving to dismiss under CPLR R.
3211. See CCA Art. 10.
255Steffens v. Martin, 100 Misc. 263, 165 N.Y. Supp. 445 (1st Dep't
1917); see Baum v. Halpern, 169 N.Y. Supp. 489 (1st Dep't 1918).
256 Steffens v. Martin, supra note 255.
257Compare CPLR § 3215(e).
258CCA
§ 902(a)-(b).
259
UDCA § 902(a)-(b).
260 UCCA § 902(a)-(b). The UCCA became law on April 5, 1964, and
is to become effective April 1, 1965. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, chs. 497-98.
26140 Misc. 2d 1087, 244 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1963).
253CCA
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The court granted the default judgment for possession

only when substituted service was made pursuant to section 735,
and held that absent a showing that personal service could not
be made with due diligence pursuant to the provisions of Section
308(3) of the CPLR, a default judgment for the rent due and
owing could not be granted where substituted service was made
pursuant to section 735.
The difficulties of service in a summary proceeding under the
provisions of section 735 are in the ambiguities it poses in its
very opening. It first states that service shall be made "in the
same manner as personal service of a summons in an action."
It immediately adds a semicolon and then states that "except
that if service cannot be made in such manner, it shall be made
by [and here it sets forth its own provisions for substituted
service which are similar but not identical to the substituted service
provisions of Section 308(3) of the CPLR] ... "
The prime difficulty is in determining what was meant by
the opening requirement of section 735, i.e., the requirement that
service be made "in the same manner as ... a summons."

A sum-

mons is served under Section 308 of the CPLR. There would
be no problem if that section provided only for personal delivery
of the summons to the defendant; the opening language of section
735 would then clearly constitute a reference to that method of
service so that the alternatives offered by section 735 would then
have something to be alternative to. But personal delivery is
only the first method of service under section 308. The section
has three other methods of service, among which is substituted
service by means similar to that which constitutes the alternative
that section 735 itself spells out.
Did the opening language of section 735 intend to require
an endeavor at the substituted service provided by Section 308(3)
of the CPLR before the substituted service set forth in section 735
could be used? The court in the Wayside case apparently takes
that position, at least as concerns a default judgment for rent.
But if section 308(3) is a condition precedent to the use of the
express alternatives of section 735, why should not section 308(4)
(service by court order) also be a condition precedent to those
alternatives ?
Reduced to its lowest terms, the question is whether, by the
opening language of section 735, the Legislature intended: (a) to
make only section 308(1) a condition precedent to the use of
the express alternatives of section 735; or (b) to require all of
section 308 to be tried before resort might be had to the alternatives
of section 735.
The probability is that (a) was intended, i.e., that personal
delivery under section 308(1), and only that, be the condition
precedent. The principal ground for that conclusion is that
the Legislature should not be presumed to have intended to do
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conflicting things in the same provision. There would be such
conflict if the construction suggested by (b) were followed. It
would invite the use of section 308(3), providing one means
of substituted service, as a condition precedent to the use of
the substituted service provided directly in section 735, which
method is very similar to that of section 308(3).
The court in Wayside followed the (b) construction, but did
so only for that part of the default judgment concerning rent
due. That itself appears an unwarranted approach under the
new RPAPL. In its section 741, which treats of the "contents
of petition," it provides (in subdivision 5) that the relief "may
include a judgment for rent due." It does not distinguish between contested judgments and default judgments, but apparently
wants to treat the money relief requested the same as the request
for possession. That a distinction should be made between the
two, such as was made in the Wayside case, appears unwarranted.
The court in that case points out that the substituted service
of Section 308(3) of the CPLR requires that "due diligence" be
first used to make personal delivery whereas, notes the court,
there is no such requirement imposed on the use of the substituted
service provided directly by Section 735 of the RPAPL. Even if
that were so, there appears to be no factor impelling the Legislature
to require that substituted service be preceded by diligent efforts
to make personal delivery. The Legislature may apparently do
what it wishes here, so that the only question to be decided is
what did the Legislature intend? If the alternative service provided by Section 735 of the RPAPL were made the
initial method
262
of set-vice, it would apparently satisfy due process.
The present section 735 was originally put together in the
26 3
1960 Report.

The service of summons provision which it sought

to adopt was, at that time, less involved than the present section
308, and it contained no requirement that due diligence be used
to make personal delivery before substituted service could be
2 o4
used.
The foregoing should at least manifest that section 735 had
no intention whatever of becoming embroiled with a "due diligence"
requirement regarding alternatives contained in the service of
summons provision itself.2 6 5

Moreover,

even if the courts be

262 See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
263 FOURTH REP. 557.
264 See SECOND REP. 155-56. There the reader will find the precursor of
present § 308; it was then numbered 25.2(b). It was that service of summons provision that the forbear of § 735 of the RPAPL sought to adopt
when it (the § 735 precursor) was originally devised. See FouRTrH Rap. 557
(where present § 735 of the RPAPL was then numbered 787).
265It is unfortunate that these problems should be encountered in the
very method of service in summary proceedings, which occupy so large a
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disposed to read in the requirement that due diligence in attempting
personal delivery of the summons precede the express alternatives
of section 735, there seems ample basis for finding such requirement in section 735 itself without becoming tied up with section
308(3). Section 735 permits its alternative of substituted service
to be used only "if service cannot be made in such manner" (i.e.,
One would
in the manner in which a summons is served).
naturally assume the use of due diligence in attempting such ser-,,ice
before it could be concluded that such service "cannot be made."
The better construction of the opening language of section 735
is that it intends to refer only to subdivision (1) of section 308,
i.e., to require an effort at personal delivery. The original service
of summons provision sought to be embraced by that reference has
been so changed (as it now appears as section 308) as to make
impractical an effort to give section 735 its original intent; and
imputing to the section an intent to adopt all of the present section
308. When, at the premises, service cannot be made thereunder
of section 735 creates that weird situation in which there is then
involved two entirely separate, yet very similar, substituted service
provisions, each involving its own conditions precedent and its own
distinctions as to method.
If it is to
The proceeding is supposed to be "summary."
retain its summary function, then the opening language of section
735 should be read as a reference only to subdivision (1) of section
308. When, at the premises, service cannot be made thereunder
by personal delivery, service should be permissible by the alternatives expressly set forth in section 735, and no further reference
should be made to section 308 or its alternatives. And service by
the section 735 alternatives should be sufficient for both possession
and for rent due, without distinction between them. However, prior
law may have come by its distinctions in that regard, there appears
to be no support for them in the present RPAPL.
Counterclaim Permitted in Holdover Proceeding
In Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger,2 66 a holdover summary
proceeding by the landlord, defendant tenant sought to interpose an
portion of litigation in our state. The ambiguities that create the problem
are readily traceable to their source. The RPAPL is the product of the
Law Revision Commission; the CPLR is the work of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure and, later, of the Senate Finance Committee.
While the earlier reports of the Advisory Committee indicate some kind
of effort at coordination regarding all the provisions involved, that early
rapport was later lost. The result is that the final RPAPL as done by
the Law Revision Commission was insufficiently coordinated with the final
CPLR as it came out of the Senate Finance Committee, and the chief
product of that loss of rapport is the problem we have been discussing here
regarding service.
266246 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. City Civil Ct. 1964).

